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The computable general equilibrium models used in the literature tend to be a bit of a black box. This
paper provides some intuition behind what goes on in these black boxes by laying out a simple general
equilibrium model and intuitively explaining what lies behind the demand for emissions. It traces out
how a reduction in total emissions allowed in one country aspects the general equilibrium and the
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1 Introduction
On June 26, 2009 the American Clean Energy and Security Act (or the
Waxman-Markey Bill after its authors) was approved by the US House of
Representatives. It has (in June 2010) yet to clear the Senate. This event
marked the ￿rst time either house approved a law meant to limit emissions
to combat climate change and has resulted in a ￿ urry of economics research
in the area. The bill would essentially create cap-and-trade programs for
greenhouse-gas emissions and speci￿es reductions in total emissions of 17%
starting from 2012. See CBO (2009a) for a good summary of the bill and
its implications. Recent news indicates that 1 the Senate version of the
Bill will be weaker, with utilities being subject to caps by 2012 but with
manufacturers being phased in only by 2016. Also likely are ￿ oor and ceiling
prices of $10 and $30 per ton that will be adjusted for in￿ ation2. It will
have product speci￿c import taxes based on the cost disadvantage created
by such cap and trade measures (called border tax adjustments or BTAs for
short) on countries that do not limit their emissions. Such BTAs would both
level the playing ￿eld for US ￿rms and prevent leakage, where leakage is the
1See the Reuters article, March 15, 2010, entitled ￿Senate climate bill to set utitlities
cap-trade￿ .
2The price ceiling would insure that businesses do not face too high a cost of permits
as these are part of their costs. The ￿ oor protects them from the risk of investing in
technology to reduce emisssions only to ￿nd that it was not worth their while ex post.
2change in foreign emissions as a share of the domestic emissions reductions.
They may also be legal under GATT/WTO, see Frankel (2009).
Existing studies suggest that the size of the BTAs would likely be quite
small for most products. This is why, as currently drafted, US legislation en-
visages BTAs mainly for producers in energy-intensive sectors. These include
chemicals, paper, ferrous metals, non-ferrous metals, and mineral products.
However, estimates of the e⁄ect of the kinds of emissions limits being dis-
cussed vary quite a bit. Atkinson et. al. (2009), which was a background
paper for World Development Report 2010, uses a partial equilibrium model
to estimate that if carbon is taxed at $50 per ton of CO2, Chinese exports
to the US would face an average tari⁄ rate of 10.3%. Mattoo et. al. (2009)
employ a multi country computable general equilibrium framework (the En-
vironmental Impact and Sustainability Applied General Equilibrium Model,
or ENVISAGE model). They compare outcomes under di⁄erent scenarios
for BTAs of a carbon tax that reduces emissions by 17% relative to 2005 by
all OECD countries.3 Their work suggests considerable room for leakage, es-
pecially without appropriate BTAs. They calculate that a 17% reduction in
emissions in energy intensive goods only (which is what the US is proposing)
would lead to total emissions in 2025 relative to 2005 rising by about 54% for
the world: the 17% reduction in emissions by the OECD countries is more
than undone by low and middle income countries raising their emissions by
about 120% in the absence of BTAs.
The e⁄ect of BTAs on emissions and exports is also shown to be sensi-
tive to who is reducing emissions. Boehringer et. al. (2010) suggests that
reducing emissions is signi￿cantly more costly in the EU than the US mostly
because EU emissions are already lower than comparable US ones. Moreover,
because the EU is more open than the US, leakage is greater from EU reduc-
tions than US ones. Full border tax adjustment policies, which include a tax
on imports and a subsidy to exports, are quite e⁄ective in reducing leakage,
with the import tari⁄ being more important than the export subsidy.
The computable general equilibrium models used in the literature tend to
be a bit of a black box. This paper provides some intuition behind what goes
on in these black boxes by laying out a simple general equilibrium model and
intuitively explaining what lies behind the demand for emissions. It traces
3Mattoo et. al. (2009) and McKiben and Wilcoxen (2008) among others, argue that
whether developing country emissions or developed country ones are used as a basis for
the BTA makes a substantial di⁄erence to developing country exports, leakage, and world
emissions.
3out show how a reduction in total emissions allowed in one country a⁄ects
the general equilibrium and the determinants of the extent of leakage in the
model and more generally. Finally, it concludes with some implications for
policy.
2 Emissions in a General Equilibrium Setting
Consider a perfectly competitive world with constant returns to scale where
all inputs are essential for production. There are two ￿nal goods, one which
needs emissions as an input (the dirty good) and the other which does not
(the clean good), and a non traded intermediate good.4 Let,  and  de-
note the domestic output of the dirty and clean good. The dirty good is
made using the intermediate good,  which in turn is made using capital
and labor, and emissions, 5 The clean good,  is made using capital and
labor. The total endowments of capital and labor are exogenously given and
denoted by  and  respectively. Preferences are assumed to be identical
and homothetic. This ensures that demand is linear in income so that the
relative demand for goods is independent of income and depends only on
relative prices. As a result, the demand side can be treated as if it arises
from a single aggregate consumer with these same preferences but endowed
with the aggregate income.6
As there are constant returns, we can de￿ne the cost of a unit of the good
independent of scale. These unit cost functions for   and  are denoted
by () (￿), and () respectively, where  and  are the price
of labor and capital,  is the endogenously determined price of the non
traded intermediate, and ￿ is the price of a unit of emissions. Due to perfect
competition, price equals marginal cost (which also equals average cost), for




4As the intermediate is non traded and essential for production of , its price adjusts
to ensure it is produced when the economy is notspecialized in  .
5Di⁄erent combinations of the intermediate and emissions can be used to make a unit
of output. The choice of where to be on the unit isoquant comes from cost minimization
on the part of the ￿rm and due to the assumptions made depends only on ￿
() rather
than   and ￿ separately.
6The model presented below is similar to that of Copeland and Taylor (2003). It is less
general as there is no joint production allowed, but more general as no functional form
assumptions are made.
4If all emissions permits are sold and there are no tari⁄s or other taxes, then









 = 1 = 
() (3)
as we take  as the numeraire good.
The dark curves in Figure 1 depicts equations (3) and (2) for a given ￿
As the unit cost function is concave in factor prices, this curve looks much
like an indi⁄erence curve. Its slope at a given 
 gives the capital labor ratio
in the sector.7 Totally di⁄erentiating equation (2) and (1) shows that for a
given ￿ the slope of the curve depicting equation (2) has the same slope as
that of the curve depicting equation (1) along any ray from the origin. The
curve depicting equation (2) is steeper than that depicting equation (3) as
we depict the case where  (and hence ) is capital intensive relative to  .
Finally, an increase in ￿ would reduce the  and  consistent with equation
(2) for a given  so that the curve depicting equation (2) would shift inwards
as depicted by the dashed line in Figure 1.
Given ￿ and ￿ we get  and  from equation (2) and (3) assuming no
specialization. This corresponds to the point  in Figure 1. Then equation
(1) gives  Once we know  and  we know the unit input requirements
of input  in  (()). For factor markets to clear total demand for each
factor (which equals demand from making  and  ) must equal total supply














) =  (5)




















where  denotes the capital-labor ratio in .









Since the intermediate good is non traded, its demand (as an input in making




) =  (6)




















) =  (8)
Thus, given ￿ and ￿ equations (7) and (8) can be solved for  and  . Note
that for given  and ￿ the ()￿ s can be treated as ￿xed so that these are
just straight lines as depicted in Figure 2. The solutions for the rest of the
world, given ￿ and the price of emissions denoted by ￿￿ can be analogously
found. Finally, ￿ and ￿ are determined by market clearing in the emissions
market and in the world market for  respectively. We turn to this below.




















































2.1 Emissions Demand Given px
The demand for emissions is a derived demand. It equals the product of the
unit input requirement of emissions in making the dirty good aZx(:), times
the amount of the dirty good made, x; both of which we can solve for as
above, given ￿ and p￿x. Since x is made using X and Z; aZx(:) will depend
only on
cX(w(:);r(:))






What can we say about ZD(:) as a function of ￿, taking as given px; the price
facing producers, but with w; r and x being determined endogenously? How
does ZD(:) shift as px changes?
We will work through the model when X is capital intensive relative to
Y; or kX > kY: As shown below, this is in no way crucial to the results
and is merely assumed for concreteness. We will consider the case when the
home country (H) has a cap and trade program so that the domestic price of
emissions, ￿; is positive, while the foreign country (F) does not, so that the
foreign price of emissions, ￿￿; is zero8.
8As is standard, we di⁄erentiate domestic variables from foreign ones by having the
7The demand for emissions remains downward sloping in ￿ for a given 
under fairly reasonable assumptions. ￿ a⁄ects the demand for emissions via
its e⁄ects on  and () First, consider its e⁄ect on . As only the dirty
goods uses emissions as an input, an increase in ￿ (given ) reduces the
competitiveness of H in the dirty good and thereby its output.9
What about ()? If the dirty good is capital intensive (as would be
the case if   ) the fall in  due to the rise in ￿ releases more capital
relative to labor than is used in  To absorb this excess capital,  falls
while  rises which is what lies behind Figure 1. As  uses capital more
intensively than  , the fall in  will reduce the cost of making  and hence
its equilibrium price. Thus, an increase in ￿ will raise  reduce , and reduce
 Consequently, as ￿ rises,
()
￿ must fall, so there is substitution towards
 away from  in making  i.e., a technique e⁄ect that makes () fall as
￿ rises.10 Thus, the demand for emissions is decreasing in ￿ (for a given )
just like in partial equilibrium settings.
Given  the equilibrium level of ￿ is determined by the intersection of
the demand and supply of emissions. If emissions are limited, then supply is
constrained at ￿  so that ￿  0 If emissions are not limited, then ￿ = 0 and
emissions equal the demand for emissions at a zero price.
2.1.1 Change in  and Emissions Demand
Next we turn to the e⁄ect of an increase in  at a given ￿ on the demand
for emissions. In other words, how does the demand for emissions shift as
the price of the dirty good rises? We argue that the demand for emissions
shifts outward as the price of the dirty good rises.
The increase in  raises the output of  via the usual positive supply
response. This e⁄ect shifts out the demand for emissions. There is also a
more subtle e⁄ect through factor prices. The increase in  raises the price
of the factor used intensively in  so that if  is capital intensive,  rises
former have no ￿*￿while latter have a ￿*￿ .
9The appendix shows more formally the conditions under which  falls as ￿ rises for a
given .
10An analogous argument shown that () falls as ￿ rises when the dirty good is more
labor intensive as well. If the capital labor ratio in  which is used in  is less than that
in  ) the fall in  would release more labor relative to capital than is used in  As a
result,  would fall and  would rise. As  is labor intensive, its price wuld fall due to
this change in  and . Consequently, as ￿ rises,

()
￿ falls and there is substitution
towards  away from  in making  () falls as ￿ rises.
8and  falls11. As argued previously, this increase in  raises the cost of 
and hence its price as the intermediate is capital intensive. Thus, for a given
￿
()
￿ rises and due to the technique e⁄ect (
()
￿ ) rises as well for a
given ￿ Thus, the demand for emissions must shift outward as the price of
the dirty good rises.
A similar argument shows that the result is not dependent on the dirty
good being capital intensive. If  was more labor intensive than  then
 would rise which would raise the price of  and reduce  Once again,
(
()
￿ ) would rise. Thus, whether  is labor or capital intensive, both
the normal supply response and the technique e⁄ect work to shift the demand
for emissions outward and raise the equilibrium level of ￿ in response to an
increase in . Consequently, an increase in the world price of the dirty
good serves to raise the price of emissions if  is exogenously set, and the
equilibrium level of  if ￿ is exogenously set as when there are no emissions
limits.
We now turn to the determination of 
2.2 Demand for goods
World relative demand and relative supply determine . As preferences are
homothetic and  is the numeraire, relative demand for  relative to  will
depend only on  and fall as  rises.
2.2.1 Determination of 
Relative supply will similarly be increasing in  due to the usual positive
supply response. Their intersection determines the equilibrium level of .
This closes the model.
Figure 3 depicts the equilibrium in the emissions markets at the equilib-
rium world price. The base of Figure 3 gives total world emissions in the
initial equilibrium. H limits its emissions at  and so has a emissions
price of . F has no emissions controls so that its emissions are ￿ which
generates a zero emissions price in F.
11This is the Stolper Samuelson Theorem.











2.3 Reducing Emission in H
Now we are ready to consider the e⁄ects of an exogenous reduction in the
supply of emissions at home. Given (= ￿) reducing ￿  from  in Figure
3 to 0 will raise the equilibrium level of ￿ to  0 For a small country (one
that cannot a⁄ect the world price) this is the end of the story. Its emissions
fall and as the world price is una⁄ected, there is no e⁄ect on the demand for
emissions in the rest of the world whose emissions remain at ￿ and there
is no leakage.
For a large country, however, this is not the end of the story. The rise in
￿ reduces the competitiveness of  in  and shifts the home and hence the
world relative supply of  inwards, thereby raising the equilibrium level of
￿ This increase in ￿ will shift the demand for emissions at home outward,
further raising raise the equilibrium price of emissions at home, though 0
total emissions will not change due to the change in  as it has emissions
controls. However, the increase in  will shift the demand for emissions
abroad outwards as depicted by the dashed curve in Figure 3. This shift will
raise emissions abroad. It could even raise them more than emissions at home
fell if  used dirtier technology than  overall as depicted in Figure 3 where
 emissions rise to ￿00 from ￿0 World emissions rise as 0 + ￿00
10exceeds  + ￿
3 Policy Implications
A point made in the literature is that unilateral emissions reductions will be
at least partly undone by leakage. In the context of the simple model above,
this occurs through the increase in the equilibrium  triggered by a fall in
￿  This increase in  will shift the demand for emissions abroad outward
and their equilibrium emissions, if they have no cap on total emissions, will
rise. This ￿leakage￿is the cause of much concern in the literature. However,
note that if the rest of the world has caps on their own total emissions, even
if these caps are just binding, then there will be no such leakage. With
universal caps on emissions, a reduction in ￿  will raise the price of emissions
everywhere and reduce world emissions one for one with the reduction in
￿  Consequently, the loss in competitiveness engendered by higher emissions
prices in the country reducing emissions will be much less of an issue when
all countries limit their emissions than when they do not and BTAs will also
be less of an issue in terms of maintaining a level playing ￿eld.
The main point is that not just the level, but the existence of emissions
controls in the rest of the world that matters. Getting the rest of the world to
commit to controls on emissions, even if the level of emissions they commit to
is high, is a step in the right direction as this a⁄ect the nature of international
transmission. If the ROW has no controls on emissions, then ￿￿is ￿xed (at a
low number or zero) no matter what policy home enacts. Tighter emissions
limits at home necessarily tilt the playing ￿eld in favor of  But if the rest of
the world has any limit on emissions, then tightening emissions at home will
raise demand for emissions abroad and raise ￿￿ preventing leakage abroad,
limiting the loss of competitiveness at home and making the home country
more willing to reduce its own emissions.
If emissions are controlled only in a subset of countries, there will in-
evitably be leakage. How large might this leakage be? Trade theory has
some insights to o⁄er here. First, if some factors are mobile, and in today￿ s
world they seem to be increasingly so, factor mobility can make emissions
controls much less binding. It is well understood by now, that attempts to
tax trade will be undone by the movement of capital (i.e. ￿rm location) in
certain situations a la Mundell (1957). In a similar vein, taxing emissions will
result in ￿rm relocation if factors are mobile. This relocation could be very
11large depending on the setting and model used. Babiker (2005) produces
estimates for leakage of over 100% in an oligopolistic model with increasing
returns to scale when relocation is explicitly allowed for.12.
How large leakage would be is ultimately an empirical matter. Hanna
(2006), shows that US multinationals increased their foreign assets by about
5.3% and foreign output by about 10% in response to the Clean Air Act
Amendment which dramatically strengthened US environmental regulations.
Such responses even make things worse in terms of emissions if migrating
￿rms use more polluting technologies abroad than at home.13
Recent work in trade, unrelated to the model above, may also be germane.
A concern in, for example Mattoo et. al. (2009), is that BTAs imposed in
order to level the playing ￿eld may have large e⁄ects on the exports of non
emissions controlling developing countries. While competitive models would
suggest that lower exports to the US when the US has BTAs could be made
up by larger exports elsewhere, in monopolistically competitive settings, the
opposite prediction exists. Lower exports to the US due to BTAs would
be accompanied by lower exports to all other markets. This occurs because
the fall in expected pro￿ts from the US reduces entry and as entry falls,
sales to all markets fall. As a result, the short run e⁄ects, with entry held
constant, are likely to be very di⁄erent from the long run ones. It would
be unfortunate if the adverse e⁄ects on developing country exports of BTAs
were under-estimated.
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5 Appendix
Result 1: Under reasonable conditions, an increase in ￿ given  reduces
 and () so that the demand for emissions is downward sloping while an
increase in  shifts out the demand for emissions.
13Proof: An increase in ￿ reduces what a ￿rm making  can a⁄ord to
pay capital and labor which shifts back equation the curve representing (2)
in () space but leaves the curve representing (3) una⁄ected. This is
depicted by the dashed curve in Figure 1 As  is capital intensive (since it
uses  which is capital intensive) this shift moves the intersection of the two
curves up and to the left in Figure 1 and so reduces  and raises  assuming
no specialization. As  falls and  rises and the price of  remains equal to
its cost, the cost of  must have fallen as  is capital intensive. Thus, to
keep price equal to cost,  must fall.
As  rises and  falls due to the increase in ￿, unit labor requirements
fall and unit capital requirements rise. Since  falls when ￿ rises,

￿ falls
so () falls. This has implications for how equations ( 8) and (7) depicted




































) =  (10)
The coe¢ cients of  and  both rise in equation (8) so that in  space
the line represented by equation (8) shifts inward. However, in , space the
straight line representing equation (7) moves out only if  and  are more
substitutable in making  than are  and  in making  so that the e⁄ect
of  falling dominates that of  rising and equation (7) moves out. This
case is depicted by the dashed lines in Figure 2. In this case, a rise in ￿ must
reduce  and raises  . Hence, fairly reasonable assumptions are su¢ cient
for the demand function for emissions to be downward sloping.
14